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Meaning, Being and Expression: 
A Phenomenological Justification for Inter-Disciplinary Scholarship 
The purpose of this talk is two-fold: first, to lay out a phenomenological justification for 
why rigorous scientific or theoretical investigation must be carried out both within particular 
disciplines and across various disciplines; and second, to show that such a justification—alluded 
to with varying levels of explicitness in various works and by various figures—itself opens new 
paths of exploration for phenomenology. 
The impetus of this two-fold task is contained, in kernel, in an infamous statement from 
the Dutch phenomenologist Herman Dooyeweerd. In the prolegomena to his magnum opus, A 
New Critique of Theoretical Thought, Dooyeweerd states that “Meaning is the being of all that 
has been created and the nature even of our selfhood.”1 This statement has long proved enigmatic 
to Dooyeweerd scholars, and the key to unpacking it may lie in the subtitle under which this 
statement is made: “Meaning as the mode of being of all that is created” (NC I, 4). In a 
translator’s note, we read that the Dutch here (“De zin is het zijn van alle creatuurlijk zijnde”) is 
based on a translation of Heidegger’s “das Sein des Seienden”. As such, the subtitle could also 
read: “Meaning as the Being of all creaturely beings.” 
Phrased this way, we see that Dooyeweerd’s claim about meaning as the being of that 
which has been created, including human selfhood or subjectivity, is a response to Heidegger’s 
question of the meaning of Being. Not only does Dooyeweerd take up the Seinsfrage, then, but 
he offers a straightforward (if perhaps complex) answer: “The meaning of Being is Being as 
meaning.” Exploring the phenomenological context of this statement opens up the philosophical, 
1 Herman Dooyeweerd, A New Critique of Theoretical Thought, Volume 1 (trans. David H. Freeman and William S. 
Young; Philadelphia: The Reformed and Presbyterian Publishing Company, 1953), 4. Hereafter cited as NC, 
followed by Volume number (I), and page number (4). 
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religious and scientific sense at the heart of Dooyeweerd’s claim. This, in turn, provides the 
underpinning for a particular conception of the relationship between the various disciplines that 
itself is rooted in a particular account of the world as a web of relationships. At its root, 
Dooyeweerd’s claim not only provides the ultimate justification of inter-disciplinary scholarship 
(in scientific or theoretical investigation) as being rooted in the full complexity of the life-world 
(in the natural attitude), but it also shows the common root of two themes that have been on the 
periphery of phenomenological investigation for much of the 20th century. These themes—
meaning and being—spring from the common root of expression, a concept that we must 
perhaps revisit if we are to more fully grasp the significance of the phenomenological enterprise. 
Creation 
To begin to explore this problem, we must first attend to the scope of Dooyeweerd’s 
claim: what is being qualified by the adjective “creaturely” in the phrase “Meaning as the being 
of all creaturely beings”? In Dooyeweerd’s language, creature is applied to everything that is not 
the Creator, that is, everything that is not God. As such, “creaturely beings” encompass all 
beings directly encountered in experience and in the life-world, including what we would 
normally characterize as ‘living entities,’ ‘natural objects,’ and ‘cultural artifacts.’ “Creaturely 
beings,” therefore, includes animals, rocks, trees, humans—but also schools, banks, and 
businesses.  
But the ‘what’ question is only part of Dooyeweerd’s account of ‘creaturely existence’, 
and not the most significant. While there are certainly things (including institutions) in creation, 
Dooyeweerd, in true phenomenological fashion, is more concerned with the various ways that 
creatures relate to each other. He calls these the ‘modal aspects’ of creation. These modal aspects 
pertain not only to conscious creatures, but to all creatures: even animals relate to each other 
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biologically or chemically, and even rocks relate to each other physically. As such, the modal 
aspects are not intentional acts, but are rather pseudo-intentionalities2 infused in the very nature 
of creation itself. This ontologizing of intentionality is, in many ways, the key feature of 
Dooyeweerd’s phenomenology, and it establishes the heart of his claim that “Meaning is the 
Being of creaturely beings.” 
Meaning and Expression 
 Dooyeweerd is adamant that meaning is the very being of creaturely existence itself; that 
is, creatures are meaning, they do not merely have meaning.3 In Husserlian terms, we could 
clarify this by saying that creaturely being is inherently expressive—it contains within itself, not 
merely an indicative reference to something else, but an inherent meaning that saturates its very 
being.4 But later phenomenology has complicated the simple distinction between indication and 
expression5 and Dooyeweerd’s usage seems to foreshadow this later complication. For 
Dooyeweerd, the meaningfulness of creation is not divorced from its empirical expression, but is 
precisely tied to it—its empirical expression is, precisely, its meaningfulness, and vice versa. Its 
being and its meaning cannot be separated—a creature is what it means and it means what it is. 
                                                          
2 Given more time, we would have to unpack this enigmatic phrase (pseudo-intentionalities), as well as the 
ontologization of intentionality we will discover in the next sentence. Given the close connection between 
intentionality and acts of consciousness, calling the modal aspects “intentionalities” would either require 
Dooyeweerd to claim that God is the ultimate consciousness—the transcendent transcendental subject—and the 
modal aspects God’s way of intending creation, or that the aspects are merely the result of human intentional 
relations. Dooyeweerd would reject both of these possibilities (though he’d probably come closer to the former 
than the latter), while affirming parts of each; hence, the phrase ‘pseudo-intentionalitites’. Hopefully there will be 
time to discuss this more in the question period following this paper. 
3 Unpacking precisely what this means for him is something that has vexed scholars for decades; here, I can offer 
only a suggested interpretation, focusing on its application rather than justifying it as an accurate reading of 
Dooyeweerd. 
4 I am referring here primarily to Husserl’s explanation of indication and expression in the first of the Logical 
Investigations (translated by J.N. Findlay; New York and London: Routledge, 2001); see especially §§ 1-16 of the 
First Investigation. 
5 Nowhere more famously than in Derrida’s Voice and Phenomenon. 
4 
 
 To make sense of this, we must posit a certain meaningfulness to the entirety of 
creaturely being. The modal aspects—as ontologized pseudo-intentionalities—move us toward 
this ‘big-picture’ meaning from within the scope of that meaning; in the modal aspects, we see 
an immanent, factical way to access transcendental meaning. As such, they are 
phenomenological to their core.  
This phenomenological nature is rooted in the relationality that defines the aspects. The 
aspects are possible ways creatures have of relating to other creatures. These possible 
relationships are not secondary or accidental, but are built into the very nature of creation itself. 
Creation is constituted by a consistent warp and woof, a pattern of weaving, an order that is 
stable though not static (given its historical unfolding, the influence of temporality, etc.). Every 
creature—be it biological or institutional—takes its place within this creational weave.6 As such, 
every creature—from an atom to a university—participates, as either subject or object, in each 
and every modal aspect in different ways.  
 Human beings are unique among creatures insofar as we, and we alone, are able to 
function as subjects in the higher-order modal aspects.7 One implication of this is that, while all 
creatures can be experienced, only humans are capable of experiencing—only humans can be 
phenomenological subjects. And a fundamental characteristic of experience, according to 
Dooyeweerd, is that it is fundamentally integral—in experience, we inevitably integrate the 
diversity of modal aspects into a single, unified experience of the world. While we can separate 
this unified experience into its various aspects and elements via theoretical thought and its 
objectifying [Gegenstandlich] power, in everyday “naïve” experience, we pull all the various 
                                                          
6Dooyeweerd calls these “individuality structures”; see, e.g., NC II, 11, 419; III, 78-174. 
7 While rocks or trees, for example, can be the objects of economic exchange, only humans can function as 
economic subjects. 
5 
 
aspects together into an experience of unified wholes (including the ultimate unified whole of the 
world).8  
Human experience, therefore, is fundamentally an experience of unity amidst diversity. 
Theoretical or scientific thought, on the other hand, is the experience of diversification, of 
separating out or making distinctions between that which I naively experience as unified. 
 The implications of this are two-fold for our purposes today: 1) each creature can be 
looked at from the perspective of any one of the modal aspects, as well as from the perspective 
of how those modal aspects come together; and 2) the totality of creation—its weave (or 
transcendental structure) but also its empirical, factical embodiment in particular creatures—
taken together expresses something of God. The first of these provides an ontological and 
phenomenological justification for inter-disciplinary scholarship rooted in the necessary 
complexity of the life-world as experienced in the natural attitude; the second entails that this 
unity-complexity relation is not only meaningful, but is primarily constituted by meaning—it is 
because it means, because it expresses.  
Inter-disciplinarity and the need for (phenomenological) Philosophy  
The latter claim is important, not only to root Dooyeweerd firmly in the 
phenomenological camp via his relation to Heidegger, but also to show the phenomenological 
necessity of interdisciplinarity: to get at the ‘thing itself’ [die Sache Selbst], we must explore its 
relationship to the whole of creation, a relationship that must be simultaneously pursued (because 
it is simultaneously lived) in each of the diverse aspects, as well as in the relations between them. 
The necessity of interdisciplinarity is fundamentally rooted in the expressive character of 
                                                          
8 Cf. NC I, 34 ff. 
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creation,9 and the ‘thing itself’ is a matter [Sache] only insofar as it is in a meaningful relation 
with other things, mutually expressive of yet something else (that is not itself directly a matter 
[Sache] for investigation).  
The ability of a creature to become the object of theoretical or scientific inquiry is rooted 
in its inclusion in naïve experience, which itself is rooted both in the object’s multi-aspectual 
existence and the subject’s unifying ability. As such, the theoretico-scientific enterprise is rooted, 
in its very foundation, in the fact that the object can be approached from various theoretical 
angles or aspects, each of which is equally true of the object: because the object relates to the rest 
of creation physically, chemically, biologically, economically, and more, there are insights into 
its true nature to be gleaned from physics, chemistry, biology, economics—and more. None of 
these offers the definitive account of what the thing is, but each of them offers a true account. 
And because each offers a true account, grasping the thing fully requires the exploration and 
integration of the truth of all these accounts. 
The exploration of these various accounts is the task of the various sciences, each 
devoted to looking at creaturely reality through the lens of a particular aspect. As such, genuine 
insight into any matter [Sache] whatsoever can be gained by looking at that matter through the 
lens of mathematics, geometry, physics, chemistry, biology, psychology (human and animal), 
logic, history, linguistics, sociology, economics, art/aesthetics, law, ethics, and theology.10 Each 
                                                          
9 To unpack this further, one would have to explore more deeply the concepts of meaning and expression as they 
function in the phenomenological tradition. The touchstones of such an exploration can be found in Derrida’s 
Voice and Phenomenon and Deleuze’s Expressionism in Philosophy: Spinoza and The Logic of Sense.  
10 The aspects are: quantitative, spatial, kinematic, physical, biotic, sensitive/psychical, analytical, 
historical/formative, lingual, social, economic, aesthetic, juridical, ethical and pistic/faith.  
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of these disciplines will provide us with truths about any and every matter to be explored in the 
world. 
However, once insight into the matter has been gained via these various disciplines, it 
remains to distill a true picture of the matter under investigation from these various 
adumbrations. Phenomenology, from its earliest days, has showed us that the process of distilling 
meaningful experience from these adumbrations is far from simple. For this reason, any attempt 
to thoroughly investigate a matter should require not only a multi-disciplinary approach, but an 
inter- or trans-disciplinary approach: it is not enough to look at the matter from a variety of 
disciplinary perspectives—we must also look at how those various perspectives are brought 
together into a unified experience of the thing itself. As such, any attempt at understanding a 
matter in a rigorous, scientific manner must necessarily include philosophy and, more 
specifically, phenomenology, as the discipline whose task is the elaboration of how we integrate 
the variety of our experiences into a coherent experience. All inter-disciplinary (as opposed to 
merely multi-disciplinary) work presupposes a phenomenology; genuinely rigorous inter-
disciplinary science will explicate and examine that phenomenology explicitly.  
The Elements of Inter-disciplinary Work 
 We have then established two necessary elements of truly scientific inter-disciplinary 
work: 1) disciplinary insights gained from those sciences tasked with looking at the world 
through the lens of a particular modal aspect; and 2) phenomenological inquiry into the unifying 
of those diverse perspectives into a coherent experiential whole.  
 But a third element is also necessary: one must examine, explicitly, the motivation and 
pragmatic outcome of the inter-disciplinary work. We never experience the world with a perfect 
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balance of the modal aspects. Rather, one aspect or another always takes the lead in any 
particular experience to help us navigate and negotiate the life-world. This ‘leading’ or ‘guiding’ 
aspect changes based on the context, and we evaluate the phenomenological relationship 
between the aspects differently based on the leading aspect: if I’m analyzing the Presidential 
nomination race, for example, I analyze the situation differently if I’m looking to understand 
how to be rhetorically persuasive in general than if I’m trying to predict who will win the 
nomination than if I’m trying to advocate for a particular political issue. In all three cases, I 
attend to the same matter (the Presidential nomination campaign), I look at that matter from a 
diversity of disciplinary perspectives (quantitative, qualitative, etc.), and I try to understand how 
those various perspectives are combined into a single experience (phenomenologically). What 
varies in the three examples is a second-order analysis of a certain phenomenological type: while 
the base phenomenological problem remains consistent across the disciplines (how does a 
subject create a unified experience?), a variation of that base problem is introduced in each of the 
examples: how does a subject communicate persuasively? How is a nomination campaign won? 
How does one best work for the implementation of X agenda item? These second order analyses 
introduce a distinct level of analysis to inter-disciplinary work: how do we employ the 
knowledge gained on the manner for a particular end?  
This third element of inter-disciplinary work is itself an essential element. There can be 
no inter-disciplinary work without: a) insights from the multiple (modal) disciplines; b) insight 
into how to combine those first-order insights into a unified experience; and c) an account of the 
purpose for which this inter-disciplinary work is being carried out. 
In contemporary research settings, we tend to answer the final question in one of two 
ways: we carry out our inter-disciplinary work, either for the sake of uncovering the Truth itself 
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(‘pure’ academics) or for the sake of economic profit (‘business’ research).11 But this choice is 
too limited; there are a variety of other legitimate reasons to pursue inter-disciplinary work, and 
clarifying that motivation—or clarifying the outcome we hope to see from that work—is 
necessary for us to know how best to accomplish what we set out to do. We will need to think 
about the matter differently if we are examining it from the perspective of general 
communications than of political science than of social advocacy.  
This final step, on the Dooyeweerdian model, is necessary as an attempt to fix a third 
level of meaning on the matter under investigation. Such a meaning is necessary because, 
ultimately, every matter for investigation is meaningful in and as what it is—but ‘what it is’ must 
be defined relationally, that is, in relation to other elements in creation. This is because the 
thing’s very existence cannot be separated from the meaning it has in the broader picture of 
creation, that is, of the world. This, I contend, is the ultimate meaning of Dooyeweerd’s claim 
that “Meaning is the being of all that has been created” (NC I, 4).  
Conclusion 
The implications of Dooyeweerd’s answer to Heidegger’s ‘question of being’ are 
manifold. Here, we have seen that one of its implications is that all investigations of creaturely 
things must be inter-disciplinary, if they are to yield us adequate insight into the thing in 
question. We have seen also that such work must needs have a phenomenological component, so 
as to understand how the manifold of disciplinary perspectives can be integrated into a holistic 
experience. Finally, we have seen that a third level of investigation is also necessary for inter-
                                                          
11 We may have other, empirical and personal motivations as well (advancing my career, spending time with 
friends, etc.), but these are not the main purpose for which the work itself is being done, even if they are the main 
reason why I personally am doing the work. 
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disciplinary work: the motivation that propels the work, and the outcome that motivation hopes 
to yield. Failing to attend to this final step leaves the work facing the ‘Crisis’ that Husserl 
acknowledged in the European sciences already in the 1930s: while the work might be factually 
correct, it will not be adequately integrated into naïve, lived experience, and so will fail to have 
or to make ‘sense.’  
And so we begin to see the need for an analysis of the logic of sense itself (carried out by 
Deleuze in 1969), and so we start to open the entire problem of the relationship between meaning 
and being that has passed through the phenomenological tradition, largely unnoticed, under the 
rubric of ‘expression.’ This, perhaps, will be the scene of the next great phenomenological 
battle—and it will need to be undertaken in constant conversation with the other sciences as well 
as within the phenomenological tradition itself.  
 
 
